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Abstract: This paper provides a difference-in-opinions equilibrium framework for pricing asset and option in a
multi-period binomial economy with heterogeneous beliefs. Agents agree to disagree about their beliefs on the
probability and asset return in each state of nature. By constructing a consensus belief, we examine the impact
of heterogeneous beliefs on market equilibrium. We show that agents’ wealth shares are expected to remain
the same under the consensus belief, although they are expected to increase under their own beliefs. Also large
disagreement leads to lower risk premium, while high disagreement on the future return in up state (down
state) leads to lower (higher) risk-free rate and expected return for the risky asset. Furthermore, under the
consensus belief, the implied volatility of the call options exhibits some observed patterns widely documented in
option markets.
Keywords: Asset prices, Heterogeneous beliefs, Binomial trees, Options
JEL Codes: G12, D84
1. Introduction
The binomial model was first proposed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) (CRR). Since then it has been
widely used in the literature. At the time of its publication, economists were not conversant with the mathe-
matical tools used to derive the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. The binomial model uses a discrete-time
binomial lattice (tree) framework to model the dynamics of the underlying stock price. It can be characterized
simply by the probability of an up move and sizes of the move in the up and the down states. When all three
parameters are constant, with appropriate specification, the binomial lattice converges weakly to the Black-
Scholes (BS) model in continuous time limit.1 Because of its simplicity, the binomial model provides a simple
1 Kloeden and Platen (1992) show that the Euler scheme converges weakly to a diffusion process if one replaces the Wiener
increment in the Euler scheme with a two-point distributed random variable. The resulting numerical scheme is a binomial lattice
with time and state dependent upward and downward moves, which are equal likely to occur. The parameters can also be set for
the binomial lattice to weakly converge to other popular diffusion models used in finance.
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framework to model stock price dynamics and interest rate term structure.2
Empirically, it is commonly observed that the implied volatility from the Black-Scholes option prices is not
constant with respect to either the strike price or the time to maturity, which violates the constant volatility
assumption underlying the BS model (see for instance Rubinstein (1985, 1994) and Dumas et al. (1998)).
Empirically, it is widely observed that the implied volatilities are downward sloping with respect to moneyness
and expirations of the options. Several pricing models have been proposed to overcome these problems, including
the stochastic volatility models (Hull and White (1987), Wiggins (1987), Melino and Turnbull (1990), Heston
(1993)), GARCH models (Duan (1995), Heston and Nandi (2000)) and models with jumps in the underlying
price process (Merton (1976), Bates (1991)). By modifying the stochastic process followed by the underlying
asset price, some of these models have been able to calibrate to the observed volatility surface. However,
apart from the stability problem of the estimated volatility surface, these models do not provide an economic
explanation for the phenomenon observed in option markets. In this paper, we consider a multi-period binomial
economy with heterogeneous beliefs and use the differences-in-opinion equilibrium approach to provide such an
explanation. In this framework, agents agree to disagree about their beliefs on the probability and asset return
in each state of nature. We show that the market equilibrium can be characterized by a consensus belief. In
market equilibrium, the wealth shares of all the agents are expected to have no change and the implied volatility
of European call options exhibits some of the observed patterns documented in option markets.
This paper follows the equilibrium asset pricing model literature with heterogeneous beliefs developed
recently3. We consider a simple economy with one risky and one risk-free assets. The stock price follows
the CRR model. Agents are log-utility maximizers of their terminal wealth. They have heterogeneous beliefs
about the probability and the size of the moves in each state. This means that agents agree to disagree and
the differences in opinion are due to the interpretation of the same information. Different from the current
literature, we do not impose any exogenous quantity (neither the stock price nor the dividend process) other
than the current wealth shares of the agents and their subjective beliefs on the future evolution of the stock
price on the binomial lattice. The binomial model is not restrictive in the sense that the probability of an up
move and the size of price changes can be both time and state dependent, implying a wide range of stochastic
models that can be incorporated into this framework. Since agents have different beliefs about the future stock
price in each state, they disagree on the state prices. Therefore they price options differently. The question is,
what should be the fair price of the option? To answer this question, we follow Jouini and Napp (2006, 2007)
and Chiarella et al. (2010, 2011) and construct a consensus belief in market equilibrium. We show that the
consensus belief turns out to be a fair belief under which the wealth shares of all the agents are martingale,
though agents’ expected wealth shares increase under their own beliefs. We then use the consensus belief to
price option and show that the implied volatility of the option price exhibits the volatility skewness.
This paper is closely related to the market selection literature that concerns the survival of irrational or
noise traders and their impact on the equilibrium price in the long run. This strand of literature was originated
from the hypothesis of Friedman (1953) that irrational traders do not survive in the long run and therefore
have no price impact in the long run. Under different model setup, DeLong et al. (1990, 1991) have found that
2 For example, Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) develop methods to construct a recombined binomial lattice for diffusion model to
enhance computational efficiency. Hahn and Dyer (2008) apply the method to mean-reverting stochastic processes specifically for
real option valuation. van der Hoek and Elliott (2006) present a text book treatment for binomial models and their applications.
3 See, for example, Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000, 2005), Abel (2002), Jouini and Napp (2006, 2007),
David (2008), Berraday (2009), Chiarella, Dieci and He (2010, 2011).
96 JMSE 2016, 1(1), 94–113
noise trading can be persistent. Blume and Easley (2006) show that irrational traders can dominate rational
traders in an incomplete market, Sandroni (2000) and Dumas et al. (2009) show that irrational trader becomes
extinct only after a long time. Kogan et al. (2006) provide evidence that price impact and survivability are
two different concepts, irrational traders can be very close to extinction yet still have a significant price impact.
Most of the models assumes that there exists at least one rational agent who knows the true or objective law of
motion governing the exogenous process (dividend or endowment process). In this paper, we do not assume the
existence of such rational agent in the market. We show that, in market equilibrium, every agent will survive
in the market. More importantly, agents’ wealth shares are expected to remain the same under the consensus
belief, although they are expected to increase under their own beliefs. Therefore the consensus belief is a fair
belief we can use to price option.
Binomial models have been employed to study the pricing of options in the literature. Guidolin and Tim-
mermann (2003) model the dividend growth rate as a binomial lattice with constant probability and rate changes
in each state, the former is unknown whereas the latter is known. They also assume there is a representative
agent with CRRA utility who updates his belief about the probability of a positive rate change as a Bayesian
learner. They find that the stock price under Bayesian learning (BL) with incomplete information does not
converge to the Black-Scholes model whereas the convergence occurs under complete information. Call prices
under BL with certain priors exhibit implied volatility that resembles the market implied volatility observed in
the S&P500 index options. In another related paper, Guidolin and Timmermann (2007) characterize equilib-
rium asset prices under adaptive, rational and BL schemes in a model where dividends evolve on a binomial
lattice. The properties of equilibrium stock and bond prices under learning are shown to differ significantly.
This paper is also related to literature on incomplete information, model uncertainty and rational learning.
Heterogeneous agents with different priors learn rationally from observed quantities (David and Veronesi (2002),
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) and Li (2007), Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)). David and Veronesi (2002) develop a
continuous time model to study option pricing in which the dividend growth rate has two possible states and
investors need to determine the current state of the growth rate. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) assume that
investors observe the dividend process and also a signal that correlates with the growth rate. They use the
model to explain open interest in the option market since options are non-redundant in an incomplete market.
Li (2007) assumes investors have different time preferences as well as heterogeneous beliefs about the dividend
process. Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) analyze the effects of differences of opinion on the dynamics of trading volume
in stocks and options. They find that differences in the mean and precision of the terminal stock payoff impact
differently on the trading of stocks and options. In general, models with uncertainty and learning provide a
better explanation to the observed implied volatilities than models with an exogenous stock price process with
respect to economic intuitions and the fitting of the volatility surface.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the binomial model with heterogeneous beliefs. Section
3 defines a consensus belief in market equilibrium and shows how the consensus belief can be constructed from
investors’ subjective beliefs. We also define and identify a fair belief for pricing contingent claims in the market.
Section 4 performs a static analysis of the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on the equilibrium price of the risky
asset and the risk-free rate in a single-period setting. In section 5, we develop a fair option pricing formula and
study the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on the return distribution and the implied volatility of the call prices
under the consensus belief numerically. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model and Heterogeneous Beliefs
We consider a simple economy with one risky asset and one riskless asset in discrete time, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T .
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The risky asset has one share available and does not pay dividends and the riskless asset is in zero net supply for
all time t. The price S(t) of the risky asset follows a multi-period Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model. More specifically,








where ui, di and pi are all constants with the no-arbitrage condition di < Rf (t) < ui, where Rf (t) = B(t +
1)/B(t) is the return of the riskless asset over the period [t, t + 1], and rf (t) = Rf (t) − 1 is the risk-free rate.
We assume there are I heterogeneous agents in the economy, indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , I, where Bi := (pi, ui, di)
charaterizes agent i’s belief about the probability distribution and the sizes of the future asset returns.
Let Wi(t) be the wealth of agent i and ωi(t) be the proportion wealth invested in the risky asset at time t.








where U(·) is the utility function, Wi(T ) the portfolio’s terminal wealth and Ei0 the expectation of agent i. For












Rf (t) + ωi(t)(R(t+ 1)−Rf (t))
)]}
. (2)
The optimization problem in (2) can be solved using dynamic programming or the martingale approach.4
To ease the notations, we have suppressed the time indexes, all model parameters correspond to the time period
[t, t+ 1] unless stated otherwise.
Lemma 2.1. Let u¯i = ui − Rf and d¯i = di − Rf be the excess return in the up and down states, respectively
over the period [t, t+1] under agent i’s belief. Then the optimal portfolio of agent i’s multi-period optimization
problem in (2) is given by
ωi = Rf
u¯i pi + d¯i (1− pi)
−u¯i d¯i
(3)
for t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1.
Lemma 2.1 shows that agent i is able to determine the optimal proportion of his wealth to invest in the
risky asset once the risk-free rate at time t is observed. Also the optimal proportion only depends on agent
i’s belief about the distribution of asset return in period [t, t + 1]. Essentially, to maximize the logarithm of a
portfolio’s terminal wealth is equivalent to maximize the expected growth rate E[ln(1 + Rp(t + 1))] period by
period, where Rp(t+ 1) is the rate of return of the portfolio from t to t+ 1. This is the so called short-sighted
or myopic behavior of logarithmic utility due to the fact that the log-utility maximizers do not consider future
investment opportunities in their portfolio selections (see Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004), Chapter 4).
4 Detailed solution to the problem under both methods can be found in Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004) Chapter 4.
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3. Consensus Belief and Market Equilibrium
In this section, we first introduce a consensus belief and use it to characterize the market equilibrium. We
then show that the consensus belief is also a fair belief under which the wealth shares of all the agents are
martingale process, although they are sub-martingale under their own beliefs.
With one unit of the risky asset and zero net supply for the riskless asset in the market, in order for the
market to clear, agents’ total investment in the risky asset must be equal to the aggregate market wealth and
hence the price of the risky asset at all times,
I∑
i=1
ωi(t) Wi(t) =Wm(t) = S(t), t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, (4)
whereWm(t) =
∑I
i=1Wi(t) denotes the aggregate market wealth at time t. We refer Equation (4) as the market
clearing condition for our economy. Substituting Equation (3) into the market clearing condition (4) leads to


















is the wealth share of agent i at time t. Equation (5) shows that the equilibrium risk-free
rate depends on the beliefs of all the agents and their wealth shares. Ideally one would like to aggregate agents’
heterogeneous beliefs and construct a consensus belief to represent the equilibrium, see Chiarella et al. (2010,
2011) in a static mean-variance setting and Jouini and Napp (2006, 2007) in an intertemporal consumption
setting. We now introduce a consensus belief for the CRR model with the heterogeneous beliefs.
Definition 3.1. For the CRR model with the heterogeneous beliefs, a belief Bm := (pm, um, dm), defined by the
probability of an up move and returns of the risky asset in the up and down states respectively in period [t, t+1]
for t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, is a consensus belief if the asset price S and the equilibrium risk-free rate Rf under the
heterogeneous beliefs are the same as those in the economy in which all agents have the homogeneous belief Bm.
The introduction of the consensus belief allows the transformation of a market with heterogeneous beliefs to
a market under which all agents are identical in their beliefs. Consequently, the market can be characterized by
a representative agent with the consensus belief. For the representative agent with log-utility and the consensus
belief Bm, by the market clearing condition, the risky asset must be the growth optimal portfolio. The following
Proposition 3.2 demonstrates how to construct the consensus belief implicitly and shows that the risk-free rate
and the consensus belief can be determined simultaneously.
Proposition 3.2. In market equilibrium,









































where R(t+1) is the gross return of the risky asset and Emt [·] is the conditional expectation of the representative
agent under the consensus belief.
(iii) the state prices or the risk neutral probabilities of the up and down states at time t under individual







, i = 1, 2, · · · , I,m. (10)















1− pi , 1− pi
(12)
is the Randon-Nikodym derivative that changes the probability measure from Pi to Qi, which is often referred
to as the “pricing kernel” in the asset pricing literatures.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 is given in Appendix A. Proposition 3.2 (i) shows that the consensus belief of
the probability of an up move pm is simply an arithmetic average of individual probability beliefs pi weighted
by their wealth shares wi. This means that the probability pm is more influenced by the wealthier agents. Also
the consensus belief of the excess return in each state (u¯m, d¯m) is a harmonic mean of individual beliefs of the
excess returns (u¯i, d¯i) weighted by their wealth shares and probabilities, hence u¯m (d¯m) is more influenced by
agents who are wealthier and relatively pessimistic (optimistic). More importantly, the consensus belief Bm can
only be determined simultaneously by the risk-free rate and the wealth shares of all the agents in the market,
wi(t) for i = 1, 2, · · · , I and t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. Proposition 3.2 (ii) indicates a relationship between the returns










i.e., the benchmarked price of the riskless asset is a martingale under the consensus belief. Proposition 3.2 (iii)
shows that agents in this economy perceive different state prices, indicated by (10), hence the option prices are
different for different agents with different beliefs. However, Proposition 3.2 (iv) indicates that all the agents
agree on the current observed asset price though they may have distinctive pricing kernels due to their different
beliefs.
One of the important observations from Proposition 3.2 is that all the agents have their own state prices,
hence the prices of any contingent claims would be different under each agent’s subjective belief Bi (i =
100 JMSE 2016, 1(1), 94–113
1, 2, · · · , I) and the consensus belief Bm. The question is which belief we should use for pricing contingent
claims.5 To answer this question, we introduce a “fair” belief to price contingent claims in our economy.
Definition 3.3. Given the information at time t = 0, a belief B∗ := (p∗, u∗, d∗) is a fair belief if and only if
the wealth share of agent i is a martingale under the belief B∗,
E∗t [wi(t+ 1)] = wi(t)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , I and t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1.
It follows from the law of iterated expectations that E∗t [wi(T )/wi(t)] = 1 under a fair belief. Therefore, the
wealth share of every agent is expected to remain at its current level from time t to the terminal time T for all
the agents. The belief B∗ is fair in the sense that all the agents on average perform equally under this belief
when the market is in equilibrium. The next result shows a relationship between the consensus belief and a fair
belief.







The proof of Proposition 3.4 is in Appendix B. Proposition 3.4 shows that the consensus belief is a fair
belief in the market equilibrium. Intuitively, the consensus belief consists of the beliefs from all the agents and,
in equilibrium, the wealth shares of all the agents are expected to be their current wealth shares in the market.
However, under their own beliefs, all the agents expect their wealth shares to increase, as demonstrated in the
next result.


















that is when agent i’s belief is the consensus belief.






> 1 for all t ∈ [0, T − 1]. This indicates that agent i expects his wealth share to
grow, which is what the agent is trying to achieve. This result is not inconsistent with Proposition 3.4 arguing
that the expected wealth shares of all the agents are not changed under the fair belief, which is the consensus
belief in the market equilibrium. Proposition 3.5 shows that agent i’s subjective belief is fair if and only if the
discounted value of a dollar payoff by the stock under his expectation is the same as the zero-coupon bond price.
The above analysis demonstrates that, when a contingent claim is priced differently for agents under their own
beliefs, the consensus belief Bm is a fair belief to price contingent claims in our economy.
5 Any contingent claims other than the stock or the bond are redundant securities in our economy since the market is complete in
the sense that each agent can construct their optimal portfolio by investing in the risk-free asset and the risky asset only.
JMSE 2016, 1(1), 94–113 101
4. Impact of Mean-Preserving Heterogeneous beliefs
It is often believed that the effect from belief biases such as pessimism and optimism should be cancelled out
when the “average” belief is unbiased. In this section, we examine the impact of mean-preserving heterogeneous
beliefs on the market consensus belief, the expected return of the risky asset, the equilibrium risk-free rate, and
the equity premium. In our setting, with mean-preserving heterogeneous beliefs6, the average belief is unbiased.
From Proposition 3.2, it is clear that the consensus belief Bm is different from the average belief B¯. We want to
see how the expected return of the risky asset, the risk-free rate, and risk premium in the market equilibrium
(under the consensus belief Bm) are different from that under the average belief B¯ for an increasing level of
divergence of opinions.
For simplicity, we consider a static setting where agents’ wealth shares are equal and their beliefs of the
asset return are uniformly distributed for both the up and down states. We only focus on a single time period
[t, t+ 1] where information at time t is known.
Corollary 4.1. Consider a market of I agents with equal initial wealth share wi(t) = 1/I and homogeneous
belief in probabilities pi = p for all i = 1, 2, · · · , I. Let (uo(t), do(t)) be a benchmark belief. Assume that the
subjective beliefs of agents diverge from the benchmark belief uniformly, (ui(t), di(t)) = (uo(t) + ²˜iu, do(t) + ²˜id),
where ²˜iu and ²˜id are both i.i.d for agent i with mean of zero and a bounded variance. Therefore agents’
divergence of opinions regarding the stock returns in both up and down states are i.i.d. It follows from (7) and









(do −Rf + ²˜i,d)−1
)−1
. (13 )
In Corollary 4.1, it is clear that the agents have heterogeneous beliefs regarding the future return of the risky
asset, while the average belief B¯ approaches the benchmark belief Bo when there is a large number of agents. The
question is whether the divergence of opinions has a significant effect on the market consensus belief of the asset
return and hence the equilibrium risk-free rate and the equity premium. To answer this question, we conduct a
Monte Carlo simulations based on (uo, do) = (1.235, 0.905), p = 0.5 and I = 5, 000, meaning that all the agents
agree on that the up and down states are equal likely to occur and agent’s wealth share wi = 1/5000(= 0.02%)
for all the agents. Moreover, we assume that ²˜i,u ∼ Unif(−θu, θu) and ²˜i,d ∼ Unif(−θd, θd), in which θu and
θd measure the degree of the divergence in agents’ beliefs. Next, we approximate the consensus belief Bm and
the risk-free rate rf by Monte-Carlo simulations with various combinations of the parameters θu and θd. Fig. 1
compares the equilibrium expected return of the risky asset, the risk-free rate and the risk premium to the
benchmark for different combinations of (θu, θd). In the benchmark case, the risk-free rate is 4.5% and the risk
premium equals to 2.5%.
When agents have a homogeneous belief in di and heterogeneous beliefs in ui, Fig. 1 (a1) illustrates that
the equilibrium expected stock return decreases as the level of divergence of opinion in the up state θu in-
creases. This is because the agents who are pessimistic regarding future stock return in the up state have
more impact on the consensus belief in the up state. Note that um is harmonic mean of the heterogeneous
beliefs; it decreases as θu increases, though agents’ beliefs ui are a mean-preserving spread of the benchmark.
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Fig. 1 Impact of Divergence of Opinion on the Equilibrium Consensus Belief Bm = (um, dm),
Expected Stock Return Emt [R(t+ 1)] = p um + (1− p) dm, the Risk-Free Rate rf = Rf − 1, and the
Risk Premium Emt [R(t+ 1)−Rf ]
Therefore the aggregate market is less willing to invest in the risky asset and more willing to invest in the
risk-free rate, which reduces the expected return of the risky asset and the risk-free asset compared to the
benchmark. The risk premium E[R(t+ 1)−Rf ] is negatively related to the divergence of opinions, suggesting
that, under the consensus belief, the reduction in the risk-free rate is less than that in the expected stock return.
When the agents have a homogeneous belief in ui and heterogeneous beliefs in di, Fig. 1 (a2) shows that the
expected stock return increases as the level of divergence of opinion θd increases. Since the optimistic agents
who perceive higher stock return in the down state have more impact on the consensus belief in the down state,
dm increases though agents’ beliefs di are mean-preserving spread of the benchmark. In this case the aggregate
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market is more willing to invest in the risky asset and less willing to invest in the risk-free asset, which increases
the risk-free rate from the benchmark. Similarly, the risk premium Emt [R(t + 1) − Rf ] is negatively related to
divergence of opinions, suggesting that the increase in the expected stock return is not enough compare to the
increase in the risk-free rate. When we combine the divergence of the opinion in the up and down states, Fig. 1
(a3) shows the combined effect of θu and θd on the expected stock return, risk-free rate and the risk premium.
It is clear that θu and θd have opposite effect on the expected stock return and the risk-free rate, however they
both have a negative effect on the risk premium.
5. Option Pricing under Heterogeneous Beliefs
In this section, we examine how the heterogeneous beliefs can be used to explain volatility skewness observed
in option markets. As discussed in the previous section, when agents have different beliefs, they have different
state prices and therefore they price options differently. In Section 3, we have introduced a fair belief and shown
that the consensus belief is a fair belief. We also argue that the option should be priced under the consensus
belief, which is the approach used when we price option in this section. We first present a (fair) option pricing
formula under the consensus belief Bm and then examine the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on the option
prices and implied volatility.
Proposition 5.1. Given the information at time t, the fair price of an option V(t,S(t)) with payoff function
H(T, S(T )) is given by
V (t, S(t)) = S(t) Emt (H(T, S(T ))/S(T )).
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is in Appendix D. To examine the impact of the heterogeneous beliefs on the
option value, we consider the following numerical example. We use the pricing formula developed in Proposition
5.1 to price European call options with different strikes written on the risky asset.
Example 5.2. Assume there are two agents (i = 1, 2) whose beliefs Bi are characterized by
ui(t)= 1 + µi ∆+ σi
√
∆,





where t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, ∆ = T/n and n is the number of trading periods from time 0 to T .
In Example 5.2, both agents agree that the stock price is equally likely to move up or down and the relative
price changes are constant over each time period from time 0 to T . However, they disagree on the sizes of the
relative price changes, which are characterized by parameters µi and σi, agent i’s belief about the expected
return and volatility of the stock. Both µi and σi are per annum, compounded n periods a year. Obviously,
as the number of the trading period n approaches to infinity, the stock price under agent i’s belief converges
weakly to the stochastic differential equation7
dS(t)/S(t) = µidt+ σidZi(t), (14)
7 See Kloeden and Platen (1992) and Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990)
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where Zi(t) is a Wiener process under agent i’s belief.
Remark 5.3. In Example 5.2, when µi = µ and σi = σ for i = 1, 2 and n approaches to infinity, the price
of a call option on the risky asset is given by the Black-Scholes formula and the instantaneous risk-free rate is
constant and given by µ− σ2.
The proof of Remark 5.3 is in Appendix E. This remark suggests that as the number of trading period
n→∞, the risk-free rate becomes a constant, depending on the expected return µ and volatility σ of the stock.
Furthermore, the call option prices are given by the Black-Scholes formula using rf = µ− σ2.
We now consider the case where two agents differ in their beliefs of the growth rate and the volatility of the
stock. More specifically, we assume that (µ1, µ2) = (µo+ δµ, µo− δµ) and (σ1, σ2) = (σo+ δσ, σo− δσ) such that
µo and σo are the arithmetic average beliefs of agents’ expected return and volatility of the future stock returns
respectively. Note that δµ > 0 indicates that agent 1 is relatively more optimistic than agent 2, believing in a
higher expected return, while δσ > 0 indicates that agent 1 is less confident than agent 2, believing a higher
volatility. We obtain distribution of the log stock price under the consensus belief at time T and compute
the European call option prices via Monte Carlo simulations using Proposition 5.1. The benchmark belief is
given by (µo, σo) = (0.07, 0.225). Time to maturity T = 0.25 and time increment ∆ = 0.00025. Under the
consensus belief Bm, the binomial tree for the future stock prices is non-recombining8 though it is recombining
under each agent’s belief. We therefore use Monte Carlo simulations for evaluation of the option prices Cm(K).
Furthermore, it is computationally very expensive to generate stock price path since for each path, we need to
numerically solve for the risk-free rate at each time step. Therefore, we use the Black-Scholes option price as a
control variate to reduce the variance of the simulated option payoffs, given that the option payoffs under the
Black-Scholes model at time T are strongly correlated with the ones under the consensus belief, with correlation
is estimated to be close to 1. Using this technique, we are able to reduce the standard deviation associated with
the option payoffs by up to ten times. After obtaining the call option prices under the consensus belief, we then
calculate the implied volatilities σimp using the Black-Scholes option price such that
Cm(K) = BS(S(0), σimp, rf , T ),
where K is the strike price, S(0) is the current stock price, T is the time to maturity, rf is the current risk-free
rate, and Cm(K) is the fair price of the call option with strike K.
With the heterogeneous beliefs, we report the sample statistics of the log stock price at maturity (ln(ST ))
in Table 1 and the distribution of the log stock price at maturity (ln(ST )) in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, we also show the
distribution of the log stock price at maturity (ln(ST )) under agent 1 and 2’s subjective beliefs (B1 and B2),
compared to the histogram distribution under the consensus belief (Bm). Using the Black Scholes option pricing
formula, we then calculate and report the implied volatilities for different strike prices in Fig. 3. By normalizing
the current stock price to 1, ln(ST ) then measures the continuous return in the period [0, T ], which is normally
distributed with mean (µi − 12σ2i )T and standard deviation σi
√
T under the subjective belief of agent i. If we
interpret the expected log price as the growth rate of the stock, then the agents agree on the expected stock
return but perceive different growth rates.
8 Non-recombining means that an up move follow by a down move is not the same as a down move follow by an up move. For a
non-recombining tree, there are 21000 possible values for the stock price after 1000 steps.
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Table 1. Impact of the Heterogeneous Beliefs in the Growth Rate (µ) and the Volatility (σ) of Future
Stock Returns on the Distribution of the Log Stock Price at Maturity (ln(ST )) for T = 0.25. The First
and Second Columns in Each Table Provide the First 4 Moments of the Distribution of ln(ST ) under
the Subjective Beliefs of Agent 1 and 2 Respectively and the Third Column of Each Table Correspond
to That under the Consensus Belief Bm.
B1 B2 Bm
mean 0.024 −0.0001 0.016
std 0.1125 0.1125 0.1099
skew 0 0 0.003
kurt 3 3 2.874
B1 B2 Bm
mean 0.006 0.015 0.017
std 0.15 0.075 0.095
skew 0 0 −0.138
kurt 3 3 3.326
(c1) (δµ, δσ) = (0.05, 0) (c2) (δµ, δσ) = (0, 0.075)
B1 B2 Bm
mean 0.027 −0.00625 0.019
std 0.075 0.15 0.098
skew 0 0 −0.159
kurt 3 3 3.119
B1 B2 Bm
mean 0.01875 0.002 0.003
std 0.15 0.075 0.105
skew 0 0 0.100
kurt 3 3 2.976
(c3) (δµ, δσ) = (0.05,−0.075) (c4) (δµ, δσ) = (0.05, 0.075)
Fig. 2 Impact of the Heterogeneous Beliefs in the Growth Rate (µ) and the Volatility (σ) of Future
Stock Returns on the Distribution of the Log Stock Price at Maturity (ln(ST )) for T = 0.25. The
Solid and Dashed Lines Represent the Perceived Distribution of ln(ST ) by Agent 1 and 2 Respectively
and Histogram Represents the Distribution of ln(ST ) under the Consensus Belief Bm
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Fig. 3 Impact of the Heterogeneous Beliefs in the Growth Rate (µ) and the Volatility (σ) of Future
Stock Returns on the Implied Volatilities of Fair Call Prices
We first examine the impact of the heterogeneous beliefs in the expected return of the stock while agents
have a homogeneous belief on the stock return volatility. That is the agents agree on the volatility but disagree
on the expected stock return. The return distribution in Fig. 2 (b1) and the statistics in Table 1 (c1) demonstrate
that the growth rate under the consensus belief Bm is between that of both agents but closer to that of agent
1’s (the more optimistic agent). However the volatility is close to the common belief. Moreover the distribution
of ln(ST ) is approximately normal under Bm since the skewness is close to zero and the kurtosis is close to 3. In
this case, Fig. 3 (d1) shows that the implied volatility is almost flat with respect to the strike, indicating that
the call prices are consistent with the BS formula. This analysis indicates that the heterogeneous beliefs in the
expected return only seems not able to explain the volatility skewness observed in option markets.9
Fig. 2 (b2) and Table 1 (c2) show that when agents agree on the expected return but disagree on the
volatility, ln(ST ) becomes negatively skewed under the consensus belief Bm, the growth rate and volatility
under Bm are closer to agent 2’s belief, who is more confident. Furthermore, the market perceives a higher
growth rate than both agents. Fig. 3 (d2) shows that the implied volatility exhibits a positive skewness, which
is consistent with the observed pattern in option markets. Intuitively, since agent 2 perceives a higher growth
9 Note that this result is partially due to the choice of the log-utility in this paper. With other utility function and time preference,
it is possible to explain the volatility skewness even when agents agree to disagree on the expected return only.
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rate, the agent has a larger wealth share and dominates the consensus belief in the upper part of the binomial
lattice which matters more for pricing out of the money (OTM) call options (calls with strikes above the current
spot price). This means that the OTM call prices would reflect more of agent 2’s belief about the stock volatility.
Also, since agent 2 perceives a lower stock volatility, the OTM call prices have lower implied volatilities than
at the money (ATM) and in the money (ITM) call options. As one moves gradually towards the lower part of
the tree, agent 1’s belief becomes more and more important in determining the consensus belief. Therefore the
implied volatility also increases as the strike prices decreases.
Fig. 2 (b3) and Table 1 (c3) show that when agent 1 is more optimistic and confident than agent 2, the
consensus belief of the growth rate and volatility of the stock are closer to those under agent 1’s belief. The
distribution of ln(St) is negatively skewed. Fig. 3 (d3) indicates that the call prices exhibit volatility skewness.
The intuition is similar to the previous case.
When agent 1 is more optimistic but less confident about future stock returns than agent 2, Fig. 2 (b4) and
Table 1 (c4) show that the growth rate and volatility under the consensus belief are closer to those under agent 2’s
belief who is pessimistic and more confident. The distribution of ln(ST ) is positively skewed. Fig. 3 (d4) shows
that the OTM call prices have higher implied volatilities than the ATM and ITM call options. Intuitively, agent
1 is more optimistic and dominates the consensus belief in the upper part of the tree as previously discussed.
However agent 1 perceives a larger volatility than agent 2. Therefore the implied volatilities are positively
related to the strike prices.
In order to examine the term structure of the implied volatilities, we calculate the implied volatilities from
the fair prices of the call options with time to maturity T ∈ [0.25, 1.00] for δµ = 0.05 and δσ = −0.075. Fig. 4
shows that the implied volatility surface flattens out as the time to maturity increases. This is consistent with
the observed patterns in option market data. This indicates that the fair option prices can mimic the important
features of option market data, though Example 5.2 is a very simple specification of our model. We expect the
volatility surface generated from the fair option prices under the consensus belief to exhibit even richer patterns
with more general specifications.
Fig. 4 The Implied Volatilities Calculated with Fair Prices of a Call Option with Time to Maturity
T ∈ [0.25, 1.00]. The Current Stock Price is S(t) = 1, the Difference in Agents’ Belief is Characterized
by δµ = 0.05 and δσ = −0.075
Example 5.2 can be generalized to take into account other popular stochastic processes for modelling stock
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prices dynamics. In general, if the belief of agent i is characterized by
ui(t) = 1 + µi(t, S) ∆ + σi(t, S)
√
∆,




where t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 and ∆ = T/n is the time increment. Then as n approaches to infinity, the above
characterization implies that agent i believes that the stock price dynamics is describe by
dS(t)/S(t) = µi(t, S(t)) dt+ σi(t, S(t)) dW (t).
Therefore, in principle our option pricing formula can take into account not only disagreement in model param-
eters, but also differences in the model structure.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we use the equilibrium asset pricing approach and provide an aggregation method of hetero-
geneous beliefs within a multi-period binomial lattice framework in market equilibrium. The heterogeneity is
characterized by the differences in agents’ beliefs about the probability of an up move in each period and also
the relative size of the price changes in each period. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they invest
in the growth optimal portfolio based on their own subjective belief. To analyze the impact of the heterogene-
ity, we introduce the concept of a consensus belief, which relates the heterogeneous market to an equivalent
homogeneous market under the consensus belief. The consensus belief is basically a wealth weighted average
of agents’ subjective beliefs and can be determined simultaneously with the risk-free rate. Through various
numerical examples, we have examined the impact of the heterogenous beliefs on the equilibrium risk-free rate,
equity risk premium and option prices. In a static analysis when the agents have the equal wealth shares and
agree on the probability, the market expects a lower (higher) expected return when the disagreement regarding
the future stock return in the up (down) state is high. Also the risk-free is negatively (positively) related to the
disagreement about the future return in the up (down) state, while the risk premium is negatively related to
the disagreement in general. We also find that the consensus belief is a fair belief in the sense that the expected
wealth shares of all the agents are not changed under the consensus belief, but their wealth shares are expected
to increase under their own beliefs. When options are priced under the consensus belief, the implied volatilities
exhibit volatility skew observed in option markets, in particular when agents disagree only on the volatility of
the future stock returns or when the optimistic agent is also confident about the future stock returns.
The binomial model under heterogeneous beliefs developed in this paper can take into account of agents’
disagreements in both model parameters and model structure. Future avenues of research include incorporating
disagreements in model structures into option pricing and compare the fair option prices implied by agents’
beliefs10 and those option prices observed in financial market to quantify the level of mispricing. It would be
also interesting to extend the current model to include multiple assets including the bond and currency markets.
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and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) Grant (71320107003) is gratefully acknowledged. The
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10 Analyst forecasts can act as a proxy for agents’ belief about future asset returns, a stock index can be taken as the risky asset.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3.2















On the one hand, if every investor has identical belief about the future return in up and down states respectively










Solving Equation (A1) for Rf leads to the relationship between the consensus belief and the the risk-free rate in
(9). Next it is obvious that in order for Bm to be the consensus belief, the following must hold in every period



















which lead to Equations (7) and (8). When investors agree on the future return in each state, then the consensus
belief must reflect this common belief. This means that ui = uo ⇒ um = uo and di = do ⇒ dm = do. This fact
gives us the expression for the consensus probability belief pm =
∑
i wipi.
To prove (iv), we simply substitute Equation (12) into the right hand side of Equation (11), then we find
that under the belief of agent i,
[S(t)/Rf (t)](qi,u(t) ui + qi,d(t) di) = S(t).
Since qi,u(t) ui + qi,d di(t) = Rf (t), we find that the relation holds for all agent i, hence it must also hold for
the representative agent.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3.4
The wealth for agent i at time t+ 1 is given by
Wi(t+ 1) =Wi(t)(ωi(t) R(t+ 1) + (1− ωi(t)) Rf ).
Dividing the aggregate market wealthWm(t+1) on both sides and using the fact thatWm(t+1) =Wm(t)R(t+1),
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t)
(
















By Proposition 3.2 (ii), Emt [Rf/R(t+ 1)] = 1 and this completes the proof.
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Appendix C.Proof of Proposition 3.5



















− 1 = [Rf (pi di + (1− pi) ui)− ui di]
2
−u¯i d¯i ui di
> 0.
The equality holds if and only if the numerator is zero, that is



















Appendix D. Proof or Proposition 5.1
Since the market is complete, we can always replicate the option with a portfolio that invests ω(t) in the
risky asset and 1− ω(t) in the risk-free asset. This means that we can express the value of the option at time
t+ 1 as
V (t+ 1, S(t+ 1)) = V (t, S(t)) (Rf (t) + ω(t)(R(t+ 1)−Rf (t))).










ω(t) + (1− ω(t)) Rf (t)R(t+1)
)
= V (t,S(t))S(t) .














Note that V (T, S(T )) = H(T, S(T ). This completes the proof.
Appendix E. Proof of Remark 5.3
Since both agents have identical beliefs about the distribution of future asset returns, the consensus belief
must coincide with the homogeneous belief, that is
um(t) = 1 + µ ∆+ σ
√
∆,

















1 + µ ∆− σ √∆
]
=
1 + µ ∆
(1 + µ ∆)2 − σ2∆ .
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Let r be the continuous compounded risk-free rate, we have from the above that
Rf = er∆ = 1 +
µ∆− σ2∆
1 + µ ∆
.







1 + µ∆− σ
2∆





Hoˆpital’s rule we obtain,
rf = µ− lim
∆→0
σ2
(1 + µ∆)2(1 + µ∆− σ2∆1+µ∆ )
= µ− σ2.
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